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INFANTS' EXERCISE OF POWERS
OF APPOINTMENT
By WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK*
The concensus of case authority is that infants may not exercise
powers appendant or in gross; some authorities would impose even
more stringent restrictions. Professor Stoebuck points out that these
restrictions, borrowed from conveyancing law, impinge upon the
basic powers-of-appointment concepts. Moreover, the restrictions
are not applied consistently with the conveyancing law from which
they are taken. The article concludes with a proposal that an infant's
exercise of a power be held voidable, but not void, to the extent
it would prejudice his owned interest in the property.
M UCH has been said about the literality of the medieval mind and
the inflexibility of old common law. The modem student of
English legal history cannot but marvel at the strictness of the
forms of pleading or the ceremony of livery of seisin. But literalism
has another side, about which far too little or nothing has been said,
a side that invites change - that, paradoxically, promotes flexibility.
A system that conforms to the very letter of the law, where form
surpasses content, bids ingenious men to accomplish by indirection
that which by direct action is forbidden. None doubt that the com-
mon-law lawyers were ingenious men. Nowhere was their ingenuity
applied with more success than to the harsh, feudalistic, increasingly
anachronistic land law. Thus, for instance, contingent remainders
could be destroyed by common recovery or merger;' fee tail could be
barred by common recovery.' The greatest of all these evasive devices
was the use, particularly when combined with its frequent comrade,
the power of appointment. Indeed, at an early date there seems to
have been no clear distinction between powers, as known today, and
uses. The inference is plain that legal suspicion directed toward the
use found its way also to powers, because of the connection between
the two. A nascent suggestion of this connection can be found running
back into the 12th century, nearly to the Conquest. By then the use was
being employed to make conveyances that could not be made by livery
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Denver.
1 SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS 50-51 (1951).
2Id. at 11.
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of seisin. For instance, sokemen and villeins, who could not convey in
their own names, would circumvent this restriction by surrendering
to their lords "to the use of" those persons to whom they wished to
pass title.' Though the lord as a strawman bears some resemblance
to the donee of a power, still he is not, because his function cannot
be separated from legal title. The first record of a true power is in
the 13th century, around Bracton's time (d. 1268). At that date,
until the Statute of Wills4 in 1540, land could not be devised. But
the practice developed of a feoffor's conveying land to a feoffee
to the use of such persons as the feoffor should appoint in his will.'
When the feoffor appointed by will, the land was viewed as passing,
not as a devise under the will, but by force of the original conveyance,
a concept that will take on ultimate significance later in this article.'
Powers of appointment were born as an evasion of the rule
against devising land and continued in the capacity of evaders of
the land law. Conveyances could be made without livery of seisin by
conveying to another "upon such trusts as should afterward be
appointed." 7 The Statute of Wills allowed the devise of only a two-
thirds interest in lands held in knight service, but by giving himself
the power to appoint by will, the owner could in effect, if not in
name, devise his whole interest.' A married woman, though she
lacked capacity to convey land without her husband's concurrence
or capacity to make a will, might execute a power of appointment
inter vivos or by an instrument effective upon her death.' Powers
have a well-known utility in avoiding the rights of creditors.10 Finally,
infants having no capacity to make a binding conveyance, might,
to the limited extent to be examined in detail later, appoint land.
Thus, the subject of this article is in part a study of one evasion of
the common law.
We might suppose there would be a counteraction to all this
3PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 577 (5th ed. 1956); 2
POLLOCK & MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 228 (1895).
4 32 Hen. 8, c. 1.
5 PLUCKNETT, op. cit. supra note 3, at 577; SIMES & SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS § 872
(2d ed. 1956) ; 1 SUGDEN, POWERS 1-4 (1856). Good brief discussions are found in
Berger, The General Power of Appointment as an Interest in Property, 40 NEB. L.
REV. 104 (1960), and Bolich, The Power of Appointment: Tool of Estate Planning
and Drafting, 1964 DUKE L. J. 32.
6 Sir Edward Clere's Case, 6 Co. Rep. 17b, 77 Eng. Rep. 279 (K.B. 1599) ; SIMES &
SMITH, op. cit. supra note 5, § 872.
7 1 SUGDEN, POWERS 1-4 (1856) ; Halbach, The Use of Powers of Appointment in
Estate Planning, 45 IowA L. REV. 691 (1960).
8 Sir Edward Clere's Case, 6 Co. Rep. 17b, 77 Eng. Rep. 279 (K.B. 1599).
9 E.g., Osgood v. Bliss, 141 Mass. 474, 6 N.E. 527 (1886); Deffenbaugh v. Harris,
6 At. 139 (Pa. 1886) ; Woodson v. Perkins, 5 Grat. (Va.) 345 '(1849) ; Grange v.
Tiving, 0. Bridgman 107, 124 Eng. Rep. 494 (C.P. 1665). The practice of givina a
married woman power to appoint lands came to be a standard feature of marriage
settlements.
10E.g., Gilman v. Bell, 99 Ill. 144 (1881) ; SIMES, op. cit. supra note 1, at 187-90.
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circumvention of the rules, and such has been the case. Two of the
theoretical characteristics of powers have been the battleground: first,
the concept that a power is akin to an agency and is not an interest
in property, and second, the related concept that upon exercise of a
power the interest created flows from the donor, not from the donee.
By way of example, consider some of the counteractions that have
broken in upon these concepts.' It has been held, at least as to gen-
eral powers, that when a power is exercised by will in favor of
appointees who predecease the testator-donee, there is a lapse, even
though the appointees were alive when the power was created."2
The insolvent donee's creditors, while they cannot reach the property
as long as the power is unexercised, may, in the case of a general
power, do so in most jurisdictions if he chooses to exercise it." Also,
statutes have made inroads upon the theory of powers; the federal
estate tax on powers is one such inroad." A final example of great
consequence to our discussion, was the classification of powers as
collateral, in gross, and appendant, a development traceable back into
the latter half of the 16th century. With this classification came the
realization that powers appendant, and to some extent those in gross,
"savoured and tasted of the land."" The restrictions on infants' ex-
ercise of powers are connected with this realization and seem to be a
part of it historically. 6
As we now turn to a detailed examination of infants' exercise
of powers, one great refrain underlies all. Powers were first used
to evade rules of law, a function which has continued ever since.
Attempts to control their use or abuse have led to infringements
upon basic concepts of their nature. The history of powers is thus a
turbulent one, in large part a struggle between contending forces.
This fact is to be continuously borne in mind.
1 3 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 300-01 (1954), is a handy reference listing several areas
in which the concepts of powers have been violated.
12Marlborough v. Godolphin, 2 Ves. Sr. 61, 28 Eng. Rep. 41 (Ch. 1750); Oke v.
Heath, 1 Ves. Sr. 135, 27 Eng. Rep. 940 (Ch. 1748) ; SIMES, op. cit. supra note 1,
at 238. But see Daniel v. Brown, 156 Va. 563, 159 S.E. 209 (1931), to the effect
that there would be no lapse when the power was special.
13 E.g., Clapp v. Ingraham, 126 Mass. 200 (1879) ; Johnson v. Cushing, 15 N.H. 298
(1844) ; Thompson v. Towne, 2 Vern. 319, 23 Eng. Rep. 806 (Ch. 1694) ; RESTATE-
MENT, PROPERTY § 330 (1940). A minority of jurisdictions is contra. Johnson v.
Shriver, 121 Colo. 397, 216 P.2d 653 (1950) (dictum) ; and see the logical, telling
argument of Gibson, C. J., in Commonwealth v. Duffield, 12 Pa. St. 277 (1849).
14 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2041, taxes all general, and some special, powers as
though they were ownership interests. Berger, The General Power of Appointment as
an Interest in Property, 40 NEB. L. REV. 104 (1960), advocates several statutes that
would equate a general power with ownership.
15 Albany's Case, 1 Co. Rep. 110b, 76 Eng. Rep. 250 (K.B. 1586), has been cited as
the genesis of these notions. 7 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 165-70
(1926). However, it contains no clear recognition of them. Such recognition and de-
velopment can be found in Digge's Case, 1 Co. Rep. 173a, 76 Eng. Rep. 373 (K.B.
1598-1600), and Edwards v. Sleator, Hardres 410, 145 Eng. Rep. 522 (Exch. 1665).




I. STATE OF THE AUTHORITIES
A. English Authorities
While there is no large body of English cases on the subject
of the exercise of powers by infants, the cases are reasonably con-
sistent. The 1665 case of Grange v. Tiving"7 held that an infant
might exercise a power. The power was collateral, but the case goes
on the broader ground that, since infants are to be protected only
against harming themselves, an infant should be allowed to exercise
a power if its exercise could not prejudice any interest the infant
might have in the appointive property. A subsequent case, 8 though
sketchily reported, seems to have held that a minor could exercise a
power cutting off her own life estate; however, the case was criticized
as "an idle case and not law."' " It obviously has not been followed,
for the later case of Hearle v. Greenbank" held an infant could not
exercise an appendant power that would cut off his own life estate.
No direct English authority has been found on infants' exercise
of powers in gross. Various secondary sources seem to say or assume
they could not do so in England.2 This might be questioned, in view
of the reasoning in Grange v. Tiving. Suppose an infant had only a
life estate with a power to appoint the remainder. How could exer-
cise of the power prejudice his interest unless possibly, by unlikely
coincidence, the remainder would otherwise pass to his heirs?
Comparatively recent English cases have engrafted two liberaliz-
ing qualifications onto the above rules. First, it has been held that,
as to personal property only, an infant may exercise even appendant
powers unless the donor expresses a contrary intent.' Second, if the
donor of a power over real property manifests an intent he should
do so, an infant may exercise an appendant power.'
B. American Authorities
A handful of American cases have held that infants cannot
exercise appendant powers. Of these, Thompson v. Lyon 24 is prob-
170. Bridgman 107, 124 Eng. Rep. 494 (C.P. 1665). The facts are singular. A decedent
had conveyed to himself for life, then to the use of his wife and her heirs, reserving
to himself and his heirs the power to revoke the uses. His only heir was his infant
daughter, who exercised the power of revocation, thus causing the fee to vest in
herself.
18 Hollingshead v. Hollingshead, Gilb. Rep. 167, 25 Eng. Rep. 117 (Ch. 1708).
19 16 Viner's Abridgment 486 (1793).
20 3 Atk. 695, 26 Eng. Rep. 1200 (Ch. 1749).
21 SIMES, op. cit. supra note 1, at 201; 1 SUGDEN, PowERs 212 (1856); 3 TIFFANY,
REAL PROPERTY 35 (1939).
22In re D'Angibau, 15 Ch. D. 228, 246 (1880).
23in re Cardross's Settlement, 7 Ch. D. 728 (1878) (manifestation of intent found
simply from fact that instrument creating power recited donee's age as 17 years)
6 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY 29-30 (1962).
24 20 Mo. 155, 61 Am. Dec. 599 (1854).
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ably best known, but because of unusual circumstances" of the case,
Hill v. Clark " is stronger authority for the proposition. A pair of
Kentucky cases, while not excessively clear, appear to hold to the
same effect. 7 All the cases cited thus far in this paragraph contain
dictum, usually attributed to English authorities, that minors may
exercise collateral powers. One 1845 New York case purports to
hold alternatively that an infant could exercise a power in gross;
that kind of power was involved, but it is doubtful that the facts of
the case support such a holding.28 Two other cases, containing off-
hand statements of little significance, have been discovered."
Secondary sources more obfuscate than illume the American
law. The Restatement of Property, with which Simes and Powell
agree, takes the position that an infant can appoint property only if
he can make an indefeasible transfer of similar owned property."
On the other hand, Tiffany and Chancellor Kent assert that infants
may exercise collateral powers and these only." In this confusing
state of the secondary authorities, the reader may wish to review the
previous discussion of English and American authority to summar-
ize for himself the common-law rules.
C. Effect of Statutes
Some jurisdictions, such as Michigan and Wisconsin, have
statutory restrictions upon infants' exercise of powers.32 The statutes
25 The owner conveyed in trust for an infant, directing the trustee to convey to such
persons as the infant should appoint. Infant and trustee joined in executing a deed,
and the action to cancel the deed was brought by the former after she attained ma-
jority. The court held she might elect to cancel the deed (n.b. that the court treated
it as voidable, not void), but the force of the holding is weakened by the court's
statement that, upon remand, the plaintiff might be estopped if the defendant showed
he was a bona fide purchaser.
264 Lea (Tenn.) 405 (1880) (9-year-old girl could not appoint property which she
held as life tenant).
2 7 Owens v. Owens, 305 Ky. 460, 204 S.W.2d 580 (1947) (infant lacked capacity to
change beneficiary of his life insurance policy); Sewell v. Sewell, 92 Ky. 500, 18
S.W. 162 (1892) (infant could not exercise "power to convey;" court confusingly
seems to equate appointments with conveyances).
28 Strong v. Wilkin, 1 Barb. (N.Y. Ch.) 9 (1845). An 18-year-old girl, having a
power to appoint the remainder following her life estate, executed it by will and died
15 years later. The court said, in the alternative, that an 18-year-old person could
execute a will at the time she made hers and that, in any event, the instrument oper-
ated as the exercise of a power. If it was the latter, it seems it would not have been
effective until her death, at which time she was 33 years old.
29 Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 121 F.2d 307 (4th Cir. 1941) (dictum that
infant could not exercise testamentary power in North Carolina); Sheldon's Lessee
v. Newton, 3 Ohio 494 (1855) (rank dictum that infant could exercise power "as
fully and effectually as an adult person").
30 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 345 (1940); SIMES, op. cit. supra note 1, at 201; 3
POWELL, REAL PROPERTY (1954).
31 4 KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 325'(12th ed. 1873); 3 TIFFANY, REAL
PROPERTY 35 (1939).
32 MICH. STAT. ANN. § 26.127 (1957) ; Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 232.36 (1957).
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referred to allow persons to exercise powers only if they are capable
of alienating land and appear to be modeled after an 1829 New
York statute which has been repealed.3 It should be observed that
the statutes do not say indefeasibly alienating land, for as we shall
see, infants may generally make avoidable conveyances. However, the
statutes presumably must be read together with other statutes pre-
scribing the minimum ages for doing the acts necessary to alien land.
Similarly, when the donor has required the power to be exer-
cised by "will," it seems a person below the statutory age for making
a will cannot exercise the power.34 Even at common law, where
boys could execute wills at age 14 and girls at age 12," there was at
least a theoretical age limit on testamentary powers.
D. Do Appendant Powers Exist in America?
Upon the basis of a small amount of authority, it appears
doubtful that appendant powers are recognized in the United States.3
The reason for this has been put on two grounds: that the power
merges into the fee, and that the power to appoint is a superfluous
addition to the power to convey that is an incident of the fee. The
latter reasoning is sensible and ought to be followed. When the
holder of a life estate has a power presently exercisable, the result
should be that he has a power in gross as to the remainder but no
power to appoint the life estate. So, if he purports to make an inter
vivos appointment of the fee, we could analyze this as being a
conveyance of his life estate and an appointment of the remainder. 7
To the extent these principles are or will be followed, our discussion
can be centered upon infants' exercise of only powers collateral and
in gross. However, perhaps it should be pointed out that the
analysis which will be suggested at the conclusion of this article will
operate without determining whether powers are collateral, in gross,
or appendant.
E. Married Women's Capacity to Exercise Powers
At an earlier time, when married women could not devise land
or convey it without their husbands' concurrence, it was well settled
3 N. Y. REAL PROPERTY LAw § 141, originally enacted in 1829, was repealed in 1964.
34In re Maxhimer's Est., 139 Ohio St. 444, 40 N.E.2d 941 (1942); RESTATEMENT,
PROPERTY § 346(a) and Comment b; Cf., Oke v. Heath, 1 Ves. Sr. 135, 27 Eng.
Rep. 940 (Ch. 1748).
3 Deane v. Littlefield, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 239 (1822) ; Davis v. Baugh, 33 Tenn.
(1 Sneed) 477 (1853); Strong v. Wilkin, 1 Barb. (N.Y. Ch.) 9 (1845).
36 Browning v. Blue Grass Hardware Co., 153 Va. 20, 149 S.E. 497 (1929) (owner of
fec cannot have concurrent powrer to a 9,
'(1940); SIMES, op. cit. supra note 1, at 274-75; Bolich, supra note 5, at 38; Tillett
v. Nixon, 180 N.C. 195, 104 S.E. 352 (1920) (seems to say inconsistent for owner
of fee to have power to appoint) (semble).
37 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 325 (1940), supports this analysis.
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that they could exercise all kinds of powers." As has been noted,
powers had great utility as devices for evading the incapacity of
married women. With the emancipation of married women, this
utility has disappeared.
It might seem that allowing married women freely to exercise
powers was inconsistent with any restrictions upon infants' exercise,
since both classes of persons were under similar incapacities to convey
or devise. However, their respective incapacities arose out of signifi-
cantly different causes. The feme covert's "disability doth not arise
for want of reason" but out of the legal nature of the marriage rela-
tionship. 9 Of course the infant's incapacity did arise "for want of
reason," and, as will be seen presently, the restrictions on his exercise
of powers were designed to protect him from his own foolishness.
Thus, the cases on married women's powers are not authority in cases
involving infants, nor do the two classes of cases ever seem to have
been cited interchangeably.
F. Theory of Restrictions on Infant's Powers
We will presently examine in detail two concepts of powers,
that they are not an interest in property and that the exercise of a
power relates back to the instrument creating it so as to make the
property pass by that instrument. In pure theory a minor's exercise
of a power would cause title to pass, not by his act, but by the
donor's. Theoretically, then, we should not concern ourselves with
whether the donee happened to be an infant. Yet, we have seen the
courts do so concern themselves. Why?
A partial answer is that the courts have purported to treat the
exercise as though it were a conveyance by the infant." Thus, the
infant's disability in making conveyances is transferred to his exercise
of powers. Obviously, this violates the concepts of no interest and
38E.g., Kennedy v. Ten Broeck, 74 Ky. (11 Bush) 241 (1875) (collateral power);
Ford's Ex'r v. Ford, 63 Ky. (2 Duv.) 418 (1866) (testamentary exercise of power
in gross) ; Armstrong v. Kerns, 61 Md. 364 (1884) (power to mortgage) ; Osgood
v. Bliss, 141 Mass. 474, 6 N.E. 527 (1886) (testamentary power) ; Lippincott v.
Wikoff, 54 N.J. Eq. 107, 33 At. 305 (1895) (executrix's power of sale) ; Bunce v.
Vander Grift, 8 Paige (N.Y.) 37 (1839) (executrix's power of sale) ; Taylor v.
Eatman, 92 N.C. 601 (1885) (dictum); Deffenbaugh v. Harris, 6 At. 139 (Pa.
1886) (power appendant to life estate); Woodson v. Perkins, 5 Gratt. (Va.) 345
(1849) (power in gross) ; Grange v. Tiving, 0. Bridgman 107, 124 Eng. Rep. 494
(C.P. 1665) (collateral power) ; Hearle v. Greenbank, 3 Atk. 695, 26 Eng. Rep. 1200
(Ch. 1749) (dictum); Oke v. Heath, 1 Ves. Sr. 135, 27 Eng. Rep. 940 (Ch. 1748)
'(testamentary power).
39 Hearle v. Greenbank, supra note 38.
40 This factor is emphasized in Thompson v. Lyon, 20 Mo. 155, 160, 61 Am. Dec. 599
(1854), where the rationale is: "A beneficial power, being in the nature of property,
which an infant cannot by law alienate, it would be strange that an incapacity which
the law imposed should be evaded, by means of a power ,.. " This approach is also
emphasized in RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 345 (1940), and SIMES, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 201.
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relation back. Still we must ask ourselves why the courts violate these
concepts. What overriding policy of the law calls for this?
One reason advanced, seemingly only by American authorities,
is that an infant should not, by the guise of an appointment, be
allowed to evade the rule disabling him from making conveyances. 1
There are two faults with this reasoning. First, if the purpose is to
equate the exercise of powers with conveyances, it would follow that
an infant could exercise a power to the same extent he is permitted to
convey. As we shall establish, infants' conveyances are merely void-
able, not void; yet, to the extent infants' exercises of powers are re-
stricted, they are held void. Second, we should ask, to what purpose
do these courts reason that a minor should not evade the restrictions
on his making conveyances? What underlying policy requires that
the rule on conveyances should override the powers concepts of no
interest and relation back? Our investigation will show that the
restrictions on conveyances exist to protect the infant himself but not
to protect others. With a conveyance the minor is of necessity dispos-
ing of his own interest and so always has the potential of harming
himself. Not so with the exercise of powers except for appendant
ones. And if we follow the Restatement's analysis that appendant
powers do not exist,42 a minor could never appoint an owned interest.
In any event, the conveyancing rule ought to intrude upon the powers
concepts only so far as its policy reason would take it, i.e., only to the
extent to which an infant could appoint away his owned interest.
The early English cases seem more satisfactory in their reasoning.
They restrict infants' exercise of powers directly on the policy ground
that the courts will protect an infant from unwisely disposing of his
own interest.43 Still, the English authorities are not wholly consistent
with this reasoning. For one thing, where infants were restricted,
their attempted exercise was held void instead of only voidable. For
another, later cases allowed infants to exercise powers affecting their
interest in land if the donor indicated they might,4 and those affecting
interests in personalty if the donor failed to indicate they might not.'
These holdings are inconsistent with the principle of protecting the
infant. In fact, the courts in those cases expressed a distaste for
restrictions of any kind.
Have we not reached the point where it can be said that the au-
41 Ibid.
4 See note 36 supra.
43 Nowhere is this clearer than in the original case, Grange v. Tiving, 0. Bridgman 107,
124 Eng. Rep. 494 (C.P. 1665). Hearle v. Greenbank, 3 Atk. 695, 26 Eng. Rep. 1200
(Ch. 1749), is to the same effect, though not as clearly so. 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROP-
ERTY 35 (1939), appears to adopt the English reasoning.
44 In re Cardross's Settlement, 7 Ch. D. 728 (1878).
4 5 In re D'Angibau, 15 Ch. D. 228 (1880).
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thorities are incomplete and at odds? Their reasoning lacks a wholly
consistent analysis. This suggests that we should make a thorough
investigation of the principles underlying infants' exercise of powers.
As was pointed out in the introduction to this article, the problem
consists of balancing the concepts of a power's not being an interest
in property and of relation back over against the rules for protecting
infants by restricting their capacity for making conveyances. These
three factors will now be examined, to the end that their limits may
be determined and a balance struck between the contending forces.
II. POWERS OF APPOINTMENT CONCEPTS
A. Is a Power an Interest in Property?
A most basic concept in the theory of powers of appointment
is that a power is not an interest in the appointive property." The
exercise of a power is viewed as an event causing the appointed
interest to move from the former owner to the new one, much in
the fashion of a shifting use limited after a fee upon condition
subsequent.47 This similarity is not surprising, considering the early
connection between powers and uses. Further, the donee of the
power is spoken of as a "mere instrument or conduit pipe" for pass-
ing the interest." Thus, the power of appointment looks much like
an agency and the donee, like an agent.
We have already seen that in a number of areas inroads have
been made upon these pure concepts." To the extent a minor's
exercise of a power is restricted by its being equated with the convey-
ance of an ownership interest and his conveyancing disability applied,
the above concepts are breached."0
B. The Doctrine of Relation Back
If the donee has no interest in the appointed property, it must
follow that upon exercise of the power title passes from some person
other than him. That person is the donor of the power."' This doctrine
must have been established no later than the 13th century, because,
before the Statute of Wills, it was a necessary part of the reasoning
allowing conveyances to such uses as the grantor should appoint by
will. " Clear statements of the doctrine are common after Albany's
46 SIMES & SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS § 942 (1956) ; 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY 2-4
(1939).
47Ray v. Pung, 5 B. & Aid. 561, 106 Eng. Rep. 1296 (K.B. 1822).
4 8 Hearle v. Greenbank, 3 Atk. 695, 26 Eng. Rep. 1200 (Ch. 1749) ; 1 SUGDEN, POWERS
211-12 (1856).
49 See notes 11-16 supra and the textual references thereto.
50 Nowhere is this more apparent than in Thompson v. Lyon, 20 Mo. 155, 160, 61 Am.
Dec. 599 (1854), where a power is said to be "in the nature of property...."
51 3 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 297 (1954) ; SIMES & SMITH, op. cit. supra note 46 § 912
(1956).
52 See notes 4-6 supra and their textual references.
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Case in 1586.:1 Oke v. Heath in 174854 explained the matter by saying
that an appointment relates back to the creation of the power, so
that the appointee takes as if his name were inserted in the instrument
creating it. This has remained the picturesque expression. It should be
observed that relation back does not refer to point of time, so that
the appointee takes as of the time of the appointment.55
Examples of encroachments upon the doctrine of relation back
have been given.56 We saw that restrictions upon infants' exercise
of powers are among these encroachments, since these restrictions
treat the exercise as though it were the infant donee's conveyance.
III. CAPACITIES OF INFANTS
A. Capacity to be Agent
Powers of appointment are sufficiently analogous to agencies
that an infant's capacity to appoint should not exceed his capacity to
be an agent. It seems to be a settled rule of the law of agency that an
infant may be an agent, his acts binding his principal to the same
extent as they would have if done by the principal.57 Blackstone
indicates this was also the rule in England.58 Moreover, the infant's
capacity to convey land as agent or under a power of attorney seems
as great as his agency capacity in other connections.59
The argument could certainly be made, though little attention
has been given it, that infants should be able to exercise powers to
the extent they can be agents. Where the exercise would prejudice
the infant's interest in the land, the policy of protecting infants might
cause the argument to lose force; in other situations it has consider-
able logical appeal. In any event, insofar as infants are restricted
in exercising powers, this seems inconsistent with settled agency law.
B. Infants as Trustees
Infants may be trustees and may receive and hold the trust
property. However, their discretionary acts in pursuit of their trustees'
duties, such as transferring property and making contracts, are
53 Albany's Case, 1 Co. Rep. 110b, 76 Eng. Rep. 250 (K.B. 1586) ; Sir Edward Clere's
Case, 6 Co. Rep. 17b, 77 Eng. Rep. 279 (K.B. 1599) ; Viscount Montague's Case, 6
Co. Rep. 27b, 77 Eng. Rep. 294 '(Exch. 1600).
54 1 Ves. Sr. 135, 27 Eng. Rep. 940 (Ch. 1748).
55 Marlborough v. Godolphin, 2 Ves. Sr. 61, 28 Eng. Rep. 41 (Ch. 1750).
56 See notes 11-16 supra.
57 E.g., Cornelius v. Moore, 211 Ala. 544, 100 So. 895 (1924); Sims v. Gunter, 201
Ala. 286, 78 So. 62 (1918) (dictum) ; Des Moines Ins. Co. v. McIntire, 99 Iowa 50,
68 N.W. 565 (1896); Talbot v. Bowen, 8 Ky. (1 A. K. Marsh.) 436, 10 Am. Dec.
747 (1819) ; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 21 (1958) ; SEAVEY, AGENCY 27
(1964) ; 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS 13 (3d ed. 1959).
58 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *466, n. 27.
59 Cornelius, McIntire, and Talbot cases cited note 57 supra, all of which so hold. Also,
see the secondary authorities cited in that note, none of which make a distinction be-
tween agencies to convey and those for other purposes.
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effective only to the extent they would be if the minor had been
acting as to his own property or affairs.6" We shall find that, gener-
ally speaking, his own conveyances and contracts are voidable but
not void. A minority of courts has gone so far as to hold that infants'
acts as trustees are binding.6
Apparently the reason the agency rule is not applied to trusts
is that while a trustee has powers similar to those of an agent, he
also has legal title to the trust corpus. Because of this latter fact,
a power of appointment is closer in nature to an agency than to a
trusteeship, indicating that the agency rule of conveyances should
have more application to powers than should the trust rule.
C. Transfers of Property
By the decided weight of authority both in the United States
and since medieval times in England, minors' conveyances of land
are voidable but not void.6" At their election infants may avoid con-
veyances before63 or after64 reaching majority; in the latter case,
some jurisdictions hold the election must be made within a "reason-
able" time,65 and some hold it may be made any time before the
running of the statute of limitations on real property actions.66 As
for transfers of personal property, they also are voidable, not void.67
As previously discussed, in restricting minors' exercises of powers,
courts are engrafting onto the pure theory of powers, concepts of
60 Fibikowski v. Fibikowski, 185 Okla. 520, 94 P.2d 921 (1939) (oral trust to hold land
for another); Hooton v. Neeld, 12 N.J. 396, 97 A.2d 153 (1953) (minors could
hold stocks in trust, but transfer avoidable) ; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 91
(1959); BOGERT, TRUSTS 65 (4th ed. 1963); 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS 701-03 (2d ed.
1956).
61 E.g., Hughes v. Hughes, 221 S.W. 970 (Tex. Comm. App. 1920). Cf., Clary v.
Spain, 119 Va. 58, 89 S.E. 130 (1916) (court of equity may appoint commissioner
to issue binding deed when minor trustee has previously conveyed land held in trust).
62 Shepherd v. Shepherd, 408 Ill. 364, 97 N.E.2d 273 (1951) ; Klapka v. Shrauger, 135
Neb. 354, 281 N.W. 612 (1938) (argument supporting result but not holding);
New v. H. E. Harman Coal Corp., 181 Va. 627, 26 S.E.2d 39 (1943); 1 BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES *465-66; COKE, FIRST INSTITUTES * 51b (statement attributed
to Littleton); 6 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY 26-27 (1962 repl. vol.) ; 5 TIFFANY,
REAL PROPERTY 197 (3d ed. 1939); 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS 21 (3d ed. 1959).
But see Weinlein v. Bedford, 138 N.E.2d 173 (Ohio C.P. 1955), which says a
minor's deed was a "nullity"; however, the parties had taken the question out of
issue by conceding the deed was void.
63 Smith v. Wade, 169 Neb. 710, 100 N.W.2d 770 (1960).
64 Coleman v. Coleman, 51 Ohio App. 221, 200 N.E. 197 (1935) ; COKE, op. cit. supra
note 62, at *171b; 6 THOMPSON, op. cit. supra note 62, at 26-27.
65 E.g., Shepherd v. Shepherd, 408 Ill. 364, 97 N.E.2d 273 (1951) ; Sprecher v. Sprecher,
206 Md. 108, 110 A.2d 509 (1955).
66 E.g., Gibson v. Hall, 260 Ala. 539, 71 So.2d 532 (1954); Elkhorn Coal Corp. v.
Tackett, 261 Ky. 795, 88 S.W.2d 943 (1935) (court said time of 10-year statute of
limitations was "reasonable" time) ; Mott v. Iossa, 119 N.J. Eq. 185, 181 Atl. 689
(1935) ; New v. H. E. Harman Coal Corp., 181 Va. 627, 26 S.E.2d 39 (1943).
6 7 Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. Hurley, 202 F.2d 257 (9th Cir. 1953) (stock transfer);
Carolina Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 168 F.2d 489 (4th Cir. 1948) (stock transfer)
COKE, op. cit. supra note 62, at *171b; 2 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 62, at 21
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disabilities derived from conveyancing law.68 One would assume
then, that when the exercise is restricted, it will, like a convey-
ance, be held merely voidable. That it has been held void suggests
an illogical internal inconsistency in the restrictions themselves. And,
as a matter of policy, it is hard to see why, when an infant's exercise
of a power does cut off some interest of his, the exercise should be
void, whereas if he chose to cut off the same interest by conveyance,
the act would simply be voidable.
D. Infants' Contractual Acts
Consistent with his capacity to transfer property, a minor's
contractual undertakings are generally valid but voidable at his
election.69 In the case of obligations arising out of his obtaining
necessaries, the minor's agreement is binding, though he may avoid
paying any sum beyond the reasonable value of necessaries." The
exception for necessaries is consistent with the principle underlying
infants' disabilities that the infant should be protected by the law.
If his contract for necessaries were voidable, tradesmen would hesi-
tate to supply him, and his shield would become a burden to bear.
Some cases have held that a minor's attempt to appoint an agent
is void.7' These, however, appear to represent an older line of
authority, and the law now seems to regard the appointment as
merely voidable and the agent's acts valid to the extent they would
have been if performed by the infant."
To be sure, the rules regarding minors' contractual capacity,
like those having to do with trusts, are not as closely related to their
exercise of powers as are the capacities for being agents and making
conveyances. However, our examination of the principles governing
all these areas demonstrates that they follow a consistent, harmon-
ious pattern. Yet, when we come to powers of appointment, we find
the courts restricting infants in a manner not within this pattern.
E. Underlying Policy
Blackstone captured the law's purpose when he wrote: "Infants
have various privileges, and various disabilities; but their very dis-
68 See notes 40-43 supra and the textual discussion referring to them.
69 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *465-66; 1 COKE, FIRST INSTITUTES *171b; 1 COR-
BIN, CONTRACTS 13-14 (1963); 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS 2 (3d ed. 1959).
70 1 BLACKSTONE, Op. cit. supra note 69, at *465-66; 1 COKE, Op. Cit. Supra note 69,
at *172a; 2 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 69, at 49-52. Williston says, at 14-17,
that the following agreements are, on public policy grounds, also binding: marriage
(but not an agreement to marry), enlistment in the armed forces, an agreement to
support a bastard child, and the obligation on a bail bond.
71 Rocks v. Cornell, 21 R.I. 532, 45 Atl. 552 (1900); SEAVEY, AGENCY 27 (1964) ; 2
WILLISTON, Op. cit. supra note 69, at 9-12.
72 Coursolle v. Weyerhauser, 69 Minn. 328, 72 N.W. 697 (1897) ; SEAVEY, op. Cit.
supra note 71, at 27; 2 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 71, at 9-12.
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abilities are privileges; in order to secure them from hurting them-
selves by their own improvident acts.'"'" This is the principle that
explains why an infant may, as agent, bind his adult principal, but
at the same time could make only a voidable contract or conveyance
for himself. We seek to protect the infant himself, not adults; they
can look out for themselves. Perhaps this also explains why his
conveyances have come to be voidable instead of void.
The original English cases on infants' powers of appointment
went back to this principle. Grange v. Tiving, where the infant had a
power to revoke another's fee, said the end to be served was "not in
respect of the person whose estate is to be revoked, but of the
prejudice to the person revoking .... ." Hearle v. Greenbank struck
down a power but indicated the power would have stood if the
infant's own interest were not prejudiced. 5 It is true that that case
and subsequent ones, when they have restricted infants' powers, have
held the exercise void. A case can be made that Hearle did so with-
out any consideration of the extent of the protective limitations
normally placed on infants." Whatever the reason, that case and
others like it are subject to the criticism that, while they attempt
to serve the policy of protecting the infant from his own folly, they
have acted beyond the scope of the policy. The infant is most fully
protected when his acts are merely voidable; that way he can enjoy
the benefits of any good bargains he makes.
CONCLUSIONS
In pure theory, a power of appointment is no interest in
property, and upon exercise, the appointed interest passes from the
donor, not the donee. If we followed these concepts faithfully,
infants would be untrammeled in exercising any kind of a power.
However, the courts have, to the limited extent there is case law on
the subject, generally, restricted infants by not allowing them to
exercise appendant powers, i.e., powers, the exercise of which would
cut off interests they have in the property. Some American authorities
would go further and in effect allow infants to exercise no powers
by not permitting them to exercise a power unless they could make
a binding transfer of the same kind of property.
To the extent they have restricted infants' exercise of powers,
the courts have done so by superimposing rules of conveyancing law.
These rules in turn spring from a policy of protecting infants from
the consequences of their own folly. The conveyancing rule is that
73 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *464.
740. Bridgman 107, 118, 124 Eng. Rep. 494 (C.P. 1665).




infants' conveyances are voidable at their election but not void; this
protects them to the fullest by allowing them to avoid bad bargains
but affirm good ones. However, in holding the exercise of some
powers to be utterly void, the courts have gone beyond the convey-
ancing law, which seems like an illogical and unnecessary position.
Further, the American authorities referred to in the last paragraph
would not only go beyond the conveyancing rule but would also
violate the underlying policy of protecting the infant, by prohibiting
his exercising powers even when he had no owned interest at stake
in the appointed property.
We need to return to basic principles and start afresh. One way
would be simply to reason that a power is like an agency; an infant
has full capacity to act as an agent; therefore, he could exercise
all powers. But this is unrealistic in certain situations where, by
virtue of the peculiar nature of powers, an infant's exercise would
appoint away an interest he owned in the property. This is the nub
of it: we want to protect him, not because he is exercising a power,
but because he is cutting off his interest. So, it seems desirable to
infuse some of the protective policy of conveyancing law. In doing
so, we should balance three factors: there should be as little disrup-
tion as possible of normal powers concepts, we should protect the
infant only where he has the capacity to prejudice his own interests,
and the protective rule should make his act voidable only.
The following formulation, deceptively simple, is suggested as
achieving these ends: an infant may exercise all powers of appoint-
ment, but to the extent an exercise prejudices an interest he or his
heirs have in the appointed property, such exercise is voidable at
his election. Indeed, this seems to have been the meaning of Grange
v. Tiving 300 years ago.
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